The conference was held from November 30 to December 3, 1998 and was attended by representatives from 44 countries and 13 non-governmental organizations, art museums and auction rooms.  Traps Regional reaction. Turkey`s decision to strengthen diplomatic relations with Baghdad, almost certainly a protest reaction to the Kurdish agreement, illustrates the main problem: the neighbouring countries of the region – not only Turkey, but also Iran, Syria and, of course, Iraq – will vigorously challenge the agreement and try to undermine it. All these states prefer the status quo of last year, that is, the division of the Kurds, but peaceful. Although the Kurds in the United States have a powerful benefactor, he is also far away. Washington lacks both proximity and sense of urgency from neighboring states. For its part, Turkey is very concerned about the possible emergence of an independent or even autonomous Kurdish unit in Iraq, which Ankara still believes is fuelling separatist sentiment among its own Kurds. Turkey therefore strongly opposed the references made in the new agreement to a future federation in Iraq and to a high-level role of the “international community” which Ankara said would give an international image to Kurdish unity. Turkey was also extremely unhappy that it had not been consulted on the terms of the agreement; it was previously heavily involved in intercurnian diplomacy.
The Washington Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, formally called the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art and sometimes called the Washington Declaration, is a statement on the restitution of art confiscated by the Nazi regime in Germany before and during World War II.  It was published as part of the Washington Conference on the Holocaust Era Assets, held on December 3, 1998 in Washington, D.C., United States.  I examine both the agreements and their surroundings in order to understand what explains the success or failure of these two agreements in establishing a lasting and cooperative peace. I find that the existence or absence of peace is due both to the language of the agreements and to the context in which they were established. I show this by examining the two phases of learning that the Iraqi Kurds have experienced, one through fighting in 1994-1997 and the second by a peacetime separation in two governorates of 1998-2006. Turkey`s decision over the weekend to strengthen diplomatic relations with Saddam Hussein at ambassadorial level underscores widespread regional opposition to an agreement between two long-standing Iraqi Kurdish leaders signed in Washington and signed in Washington earlier this month. The agreement reaffirms the desire of the Iraqi Kurds to avoid further intergroup struggles and to prevent Saddam Hussein`s return to Kurdish-held areas. However, it is doubtful that the agreement supports or undermines these objectives and that the increased verbal commitment of the United States to the Iraqi Kurds, which probably made the agreement possible, is sustainable. Background. The Washington agreement is the latest in a series of agreements that have erupted since 1994 by the opposing Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Massoud Barzan and Jalal Talabani Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).